After Iraq and Syria, where will terrorism rise next?

During the early years of the Syrian civil war, the US largely ignored the high risk the Syrian conflict had of spilling into Iraq. Now that both Iraq and Syria are seeing a recession in violence, high risks are increasing elsewhere, again largely ignored by the US.

One such high risk area is Yemen. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula continues to benefit enormously from the Yemen war waged by Saudi Arabia. As ISIS grew out of the chaos of the Iraq War and matured in the furnace of the Syrian Civil War, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is the only benefactor of the Saudi air war in Yemen.

Libya is another high risk area. For jihadist groups, Libya was always a battle which could be fought later. After the overthrow of Moammar Al-Qaddafi, many of the weapons held by the regime were sent across the Mediterranean through Turkey into Syria to further arm the rebels. Fighters who had previously fought for the overthrow of the regime in Libya turned to fight for another: Assad's regime in Syria.

Now, having suffered a serious setback in Syria - which, with the entry of Turkey into Idlib, will only get worse - it would be time for jihadist minds to again return to Libya from Syria, to make sure the Arab Islamist Revolution still survives in one country.

However, efforts have been made to make sure that several areas will not return to instability and chaos as before. President Trump, in outlining his Afghanistan policy, has assured his allies that the US will not be withdrawing from Afghanistan, unlike President Obama in Iraq, and Trump will in fact be pushing for true and lasting victory in Afghanistan over Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

President Trump has also maintained that a residual force will be left behind in Iraq after ISIS is defeated, to make sure that ISIS will be unable to return to Iraq as strongly as it did in 2014. In addition, President Trump has prioritized peace in Syria over the removal of Bashar Al-Assad, and has prioritized peace in Syria over the complaints of US allies such as Israel. It is also important to note that after the destruction of ISIS, the US intends on withdrawing from Syria.

While these US policies regarding Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria are sound, President Trump's own support for the Saudi war on Yemen makes him complicit in the fueling of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Libya, on the other hand, is the failure of the Obama Administration and Europe: Obama for overthrowing Qaddafi and Europe for not looking after Libya in its aftermath.

While violence is set to increase in Libya and Yemen in the next year, in the next 5 - 10 years, violence is set to increase in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Both Libya and Yemen are likely to fall into Russia's orbit, as President Trump intends to stay focused on his America First agenda and not get tangled in additional Middle-East quagmires.

Regarding Saudi Arabia, it may even be that the US will be so sick of intervention that, with Russia in control of Syria, Libya and Yemen, and with the US prioritizing stability in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Trump Administration will call on other world powers - such as the EU, Egypt and Jordan - to intervene on behalf of Saudi Arabia.

In the mean time, much scrutiny will be placed on both the Trump and Obama Administrations for the failures of stopping terrorism from spreading into Libya and Yemen at an accelerated rate.

Key points from Trump's Afghan War speech

In a recent speech Trump outlined his Administration's approach to Afghanistan. It departs from Obama's approach in several key ways which will be detailed in this article.


1) President Trump fights in Afghanistan to win. Obama's approach was to not lose the war in Afghanistan. His desire was for a withdrawal and a pullout, but signalling this to the American public also signaled this to the Afghan government and, crucially, to the Taliban. The Afghan government was unwilling to fight hard for their country so long as US support was not guaranteed, and the Taliban was able to wait out until the end of Obama's timeline before increasing their own insurgency.

Trump does not deal in such notions. His desire is for no timelines to be published and no strategies to be made known to the American people, except for the eradication of Al-Qaeda and ISIS from the region. Such a task, though daunting, is not impossible with a US apparatus willing to fight for victory.

2) US stance on Pakistan and India has changed. President Trump's change in approach to Pakistan is long overdue. They have long played a double game with the US - on the one hand, supporting the Afghan government and US initiative in the region; on the other hand, supporting the Taliban and giving them and other terrorist groups safe havens. Trump's strategy is to isolate Pakistan and hold their feet to the fire, through economic sanctions and gaining more support from India.

India has strategic objectives in Afghanistan. Stability in the region greatly eases the burden on India, but also it is a chance to defeat Pakistan by proxy. India, like the United States, benefits from the strengthening of the Afghan government and defeating the Taliban. An increased role for India is more likely to result in peace for Afghanistan.

3) Nation-building in Afghanistan is over. President Trump has long maintained that his foreign policy objectives are not focused on recreating the US in other countries. This is certainly a breath of fresh air given Obama's unyielding support for the Arab Spring and for democracy in Afghanistan. It means that President Trump will be less worried about corruption, democracy and "human rights" in Afghanistan, on the condition that counter-terrorism objectives continue to be reached.

In this is the realization that strengthening democracy in a country like Afghanistan may result in losing the war against terrorism, but letting democracy fail and turning a blind eye to some forms of corruption while strengthening counter-terrorism services and military may provide a more lasting peace. The US military will not be responsible for building democracy in Afghanistan; in Trump's words, they are in Afghanistan to kill terrorists.

4) The US military has been unleashed. Gone are restraints and micromanagement from the White House during the Obama years. President Trump is going to unleash the US military to let them achieve peace in Afghanistan as they are able. They will be unhindered in targeting Taliban, ISIS and Al-Qaeda members and will serve in a largely advisory role to the Afghan forces, while likely to up the air campaign against the Taliban.


Whether or not President Trump's strategy will produce victory in Afghanistan is unclear. What is clear, however, is that at the very least, the Taliban are about to receive a thrashing long overdue.

As Iraq, Syria defeat ISIS, Al-Qaeda looms large

Mosul has been recaptured by the Iraqi Army from ISIS. ISIS-held Raqqa is currently besieged from all sides by the Syrian Kurds. And the Syrian Arab Army, bolstered by de-escalation zones in the west of the country, has massed its troops in the east, scoring victory after victory against ISIS in Syria.

While things are currently looking up for Syria and Iraq, Al-Qaeda still maintains its presence in Afghanistan. A resurgent Taliban is winning the war against the government led by Ashraf Ghani and, contrary to popular belief, the Taliban maintains its close relationship with Al-Qaeda, as the leader of Al-Qaeda still pledges allegiance to the leader of the Taliban:

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/ayman-al-zawahiri-swears-allegiance-to-the-talibans-new-leader.php

This exposes fatal flaws in the previous President Obama's strategy: killing Bin Laden did not stop Al-Qaeda from growing. Announcing troop surges and troop withdrawals in Afghanistan did not work. Negotiating with the Taliban was as impractical as negotiating with Al-Qaeda. And, finally, focusing on degrading, defeating and destroying ISIS has not stopped a resurgent Al-Qaeda from taking the limelight back.

Though ISIS is a long-term threat which is highly likely to return, Al-Qaeda is the more immediate threat, and the threat has grown. Not only has the Taliban filled the vacuum left by Obama in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has become a potent threat taking advantage of the Saudi war on Yemen. Al-Qaeda also has a strong presence in Libya and, finally, those "moderate rebels" in Syria are all allied with Al-Qaeda.

While President Trump can be blamed for Al-Qaeda's presence in Yemen, President Obama is to blame for the Al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan, Syria and Libya. Libyan President Moammar Al-Qaddafi was overthrown in 2011, creating a vacuum in Libya, and Syrian rebels were supported by the US government from 2013 until this year. Ironically, it has been Russia who has been moving to quell the Al-Qaeda threat in Syria and Libya and, unlike President Obama, has had more success in rooting them out.

Afghanistan however falls to US President Donald Trump. Over the past 8 months there has been much debating in the White House about the way forward in Afghanistan, and President Trump has grown increasingly frustrated with US generals suggesting the way forward is to continue the same as before. President Trump has been exploring a wide range of options, including withdrawal and handing Afghanistan to private contractors, but the most enticing idea yet has been giving the US and Afghan troops a new goal: minerals.

Afghanistan's minerals make up a large revenue for the Taliban, and depriving the Taliban of this revenue would weaken their influence in the country considerably. Minerals in the government's hands would help Afghanistan stand on its own two feet and help win rogue Afghan tribes back to the government. It would also win him support back home for continuing the war.

But Afghanistan is not the only country from which Trump will face his counter-terrorism test: Yemen is the other. Trump has strengthened US support in the Saudi war against Yemen and this has resulted in an increase in Al-Qaeda's presence there. The rise of Al-Qaeda in Yemen (commonly known as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) is not dependent on territory controlled, as ISIS is; rather it is dependent on tribes which are loyal to and grateful for Al-Qaeda's presence in the region. And there are many such tribes in Yemen.

Even should Trump create a cohesive strategy to root out the Taliban from Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda will become even more powerful and resurgent in Yemen. This will likely strain US-Saudi relations and allow Russia a hand in solving yet another US-created quagmire.

The Al-Qaeda threat looms large, too large for the US public to bear any longer.

Why ISIS will not return to Al-Qaeda

With the destruction of ISIS' territory, some pundits believe the group will return to Al-Qaeda. This is highly unlikely, because Abu Musab Az-Zarqawi's vision differed considerably from Bin Laden's.

ISIS was born out of the chaos of the Iraq War. Abu Musab Az-Zarqawi, the founder of ISIS under a different name, believed in the deliberate targeting of Shi'ite Muslims and other non-Sunnis to awaken the Sunni Muslim giant - a giant which stretches across every Muslim country in the globe except Iraq and Iran. Al-Qaeda, by contrast, has avoided inflaming sectarian hatred and instead wishes to bankrupt the 'far' enemies of Islam - such as the US and Russia - destroy Israel and slowly return the Muslim world to a state in which a Caliph might rule.

According to Michael Ware - a journalist who lived in Iraq after the war began - Zarqawi's group only pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda out of necessity and not because it aspired to its ideology. With ISIS having made its mark across Syria, Iraq and the globe; having declared the global Caliphate, it would completely undermine the ISIS vision of leading the global jihad to return to Al-Qaeda, and that even with the destruction of all ISIS territory.

More likely is that ISIS will return as an insurgency group in Iraq with the aim of destabilizing the Arabian Gulf, to provoke the last war between 'Rome' (that is, the United States) and the Islamic State. And in this regard, ISIS is likely to succeed where Al-Qaeda cannot, because Saudi Arabia and ISIS are more alike than either of them are to Al-Qaeda.

Needless to say, ISIS will not return to Al-Qaeda. But both will remain considerable threats to any country wishing to deal with the Middle-East.

What if ISIS takes over Saudi Arabia? Detailed analysis.

With the rise of Mohammed Bin Salman in Saudi Arabia, the likelihood of either civil war or an outright takeover of the conservative kingdom by ISIS has increased exponentially. This has only been brought further to likelihood by Iranian dominance in Iraq and Syria.

The important question is this: what if ISIS takes over Saudi Arabia? What would happen to the Middle-East and global politics?

1) US' hands would be tied. With pressure mounting on the current Trump Administration to deliver its promise of "America First," with military commitment to Iraq and Afghanistan remaining for the foreseeable future, with the threat of North Korea, there would little the US could do about an ISIS takeover of Saudi Arabia.

US strategy in such circumstance would be to use other Sunni proxies, such as the Jordanian and Egyptian armies, to wrest back control of Saudi Arabia from ISIS.

2) Iraq would be given Saudi's status of most important non-Israeli ally. With the destruction of the Saudi kingdom, the US would be forced to look elsewhere for its top non-Israeli ally in the Middle-East. Iraq would be the obvious choice for several reasons:

First, Iraq has oil, and oil comparable to Saudi oil. Second, it would be unlikely that the US would choose Iran as its top ally, due to its anti-Israeli rhetoric, and it would be less costly politically to use Iraq as the mediator between itself and Iran. Third, Iraq is the vulnerable corridor through which ISIS could expand its territory into the rest of the Middle-East, so it is in American interest to secure it. Fourth, Iraq and US already have better relations than the US has with several neighboring countries.

3) More Muslim countries would be less hesitant to ally or increase relations with Israel. Egyptian and Jordanian relations with Israel are already strong, but in such circumstances these relations would only become stronger.

From Iran and its allies, Iraq is the most likely country to increase relations with Israel substantially, and this due to the Iraqi-US alliance. This would parallel the current US-Israeli-Saudi relations of today, with Iraq instead of Saudi. Even the more anti-Israel states and groups from Iran's side, like Syria, Palestine and Hezbollah, would be forced to some level of rapprochement with Israel to counter the ISIS threat in the Gulf.

4) Other Gulf kingdoms would fall. With Saudi Arabia engulfed by ISIS, the other Gulf kingdoms would be vulnerable to ISIS takeover. Among these include Kuwait, Bahran, UAE and Qatar.

Kuwait and Bahrain are the most vulnerable because they themselves have larger Shi'ite populations. Should Shi'ite populations rise up, ISIS would correspondingly find more sympathy in each country. Qatar and UAE are vulnerable, but less so, as Qatar is protected by Turkey, and the UAE would be protected by Egypt, which helped fund Sisi's ascent to power.

Even so, Bahrain becoming the capital of the new ISIS Caliphate is a frightening possibility.

5) Oman and Yemen would likely survive. While the fate of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE is questionable, Oman and Yemen are more likely to survive an ISIS takeover of Saudi Arabia.

Why? A large reason is Russia. Russia has been eyeing a foothold in Yemen on the side of the Houthis for some time now. With ISIS warring against the Houthis in this scenario, Russia would be legitimized in establishing a no-fly-zone in Yemen and driving ISIS away. The Houthis would then easily take control of the remainder of Yemen as a buffer against ISIS-controlled territory to the north.

With regards to Oman, Oman has endured much peace in the region, and this can be traced back to the main expression of Islam in Oman: Ibadiya. Ibadiya is less focused on the physical jihad than its Sunni and Shi'ite counterparts, and instead cracks down hard on fitna, which is division or dissent. With a Houthi-controlled Yemen to its west and Iran just across the sea, Oman would survive and become an important partner for the west against ISIS.

6) Shi'ites would be killed or driven out. This is one of the more inhuman aspects of an ISIS takeover of Saudi Arabia: Shi'ites would be systematically targeted for extinction. Cities like Qatif and Damam would be levelled to the ground as ISIS would seek Shi'ite genocide. Many would flee to Kuwait and Bahrain, which would only bring ISIS to follow them.

For Gulf monarchies, this would be seen as a convenient way of removing Iran's foothold from the Arabian Gulf without directly engaging in brutal killings. However, the likelihood of their own demise would only increase with letting ISIS ethnically cleanse the Arabian Gulf of the Shi'ites.

Shi'ites surviving the genocide would likely relocate to Iran, Iraq or Syria. Thus the Sunni-Shi'ite balance of the region would be more evenly restored to how it was before the Iraq War.

7) Enormous instability would follow. The global instability that would follow is important to recognize. Not only would oil prices skyrocket; not only would Iran, Iraq, Russia and China get enormously wealthy, but many Muslims would fight jihad either for or against ISIS in the Arabian Peninsula. Millions would fight and millions would die there for or against ISIS.

More concerning for counter-terrorism is that, with ISIS' control of Mecca and Medina, their authority on Islam would solidify, and Muslims would pledge allegiance to ISIS all across the Muslim world, forcing their governments to fight and defeat them in many different countries.

8) The Saudi royal family might return. The Saudi royal family has survived attempted destruction before. When the Arabs revolted against the Ottoman Empire with help from Saud and Ibn Abdul Wahhab, the Saudis were crushed by the Ottomans, but they returned two centuries later in the kingdom we know today. With the Sauds being an enormously wealthy family, many would find shelter in the West, and could perhaps insight rebellion against ISIS once excitement for the reestablishment of the Caliphate has waned and the horrors of ISIS are revealed.



Much must be said about the foolishness of American foreign policy in the Middle-East. This possibility - that ISIS would take over Saudi Arabia - is unavoidable, because Mohammed Bin Salman serves as the best poster boy for ISIS recruitment in the Arabian Gulf.

Did Russia kill Baghdadi?

Russia claimed to kill Baghdadi in an airstrike several weeks ago. Should the information prove to be true, then this would be an enormous boost for the Russian air campaign in Syria. It would also strengthen the Syrian, Russian and Iranian hand in the Astana and Geneva talks for the conclusion of the Syrian civil war.

While the death of Baghdadi would certainly be a victory in the war on terror, it would not mean the end of ISIS, even should all territory in Iraq and Syria be regained. One only has to look back to how the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have risen to prominence after the death of Bin Laden to see that killing the leader of a terror organisation does not guarantee its destruction.

Further, examples should be noted from ISIS' own history. After the death of Abu Musab Az-Zarqawi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq from 1999 - 2006, the most bitter fighting was initiated by then AQI against the US-backed Iraqi forces. After the death of Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi in 2010, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, (ISI was AQI with an updated name) Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi took control. He revolutionized ISI by making the most of the Syrian Civil War to transform the group into ISIS. Today, the group goes by the name "Islamic State" and has stolen the limelight from Al-Qaeda.

While counter-terrorism experts say that one of Baghdadi's two deputies will take control of ISIS after the death of Baghdadi, there is a good reason to question this. Firstly, Baghdadi's two deputies are officers from the Saddam Hussein regime and have no religious authority in and of themselves. The next stage in ISIS' transformation is a critical lifeline: ISIS will transform from a Caliphate Army across Syria and Iraq to an Insurgency stretching from Iraq down into the Arabian Gulf. And the only way to ignite a civil war in a Gulf country like Saudi Arabia is to have someone with Islamic legitimacy to succeed Baghdadi as the next Caliph.

Many who celebrate the death of Baghdadi fail to see that ISIS' most deadly fight is yet to come. The Iraqi-Syrian war will be but a sideshow compared to ISIS' big battle for the Gulf. And a Caliph with Islamic legitimacy will very likely rise in Baghdadi's place.

Turkey deploys troops to Qatar to protect terror state

Erdogan's Turkey and Qatar share a very similar outlook and foreign policy.

In Libya, Egypt, Syria and Yemen, Turkey and Qatar have supported the Muslim Brotherhood. Both countries also supported ISIS long after Saudi Arabia and allies withdrew support for it.

And now, as Qatar becomes increasingly isolated by other members of the GCC, Turkey has deployed troops to the small resource-rich country in a show of support. Once again, Turkey has shown itself to be a loggerheads with Trump policy.

Trump gave the green light to funding Kurds in Syria against ISIS. This policy - also implemented under Obama - irritated Turkey so much that it mended ties with both Russia and Syria, to keep Bashar Al-Assad in power and curb Kurdish strength in Syria.

Now, after Trump's historic speech in Saudi Arabia, GCC nations are attempting to curb terrorism in their region by isolating Qatar, perhaps the largest funder of terrorism in the world. And Turkey has deployed troops to protect the terror state.

This is likely to force a realignment of powers in the region. Qatar and Turkey will end up more fully allied with the Iranian axis, and an opportunity now exists for Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC to push for closer relations with Iraq. If isolating Qatar was part of Trump's desired policy, improvement of GCC-Iraqi relations is also.

Things are now moving very dangerously for the Arabian Gulf. Should relations deteriorate in any form between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Turkey could use its base in Qatar from which to deploy terrorists into Saudi Arabia - after all, Qatar and Saudi Arabia do share a border. Turkey is overflowing with refugees - redeploying some of those refugees into Saudi Arabia via Qatar might be a way to decrease its problem.

Whether Iran would also get in on such a Qatar-Turkey plot is difficult to guess, as the likely outcome of a war in Saudi Arabia would be more stability for Syria and perhaps for Iraq as well, but Iran could lose their Shi'ite minorities in the Gulf.

What is certain now that Turkey has gotten involved is that regime change and military escalation against Qatar are now very unlikely. What is possible is that Qatar will be expelled from the GCC, sanctions will be put on Qatar and the US might have to relocate its military base from Qatar to the UAE.

On the other hand, Turkish-Saudi relations may deteriorate completely, and a civil war in Saudi Arabia may be plotted in retaliation to isolating Qatar.