The impending Russia-US deal on Afghanistan

To win more speedily in Afghanistan, the United States must repair relations with Russia, withdraw from Pakistan and take the northern route into the country.

If there was ever a chance for President Trump to restore relations with Russia, weaken China and defeat radical Islamism, Afghanistan is that opportunity.

It has been a year since the Trump Administration unveiled the South Asia strategy, which was aimed at ending the Afghan war by having a conditions-based approach rather than a time-based approach, applying more international pressure on Pakistan, increasing trilateral ties between the US, India and Afghanistan, and, most importantly, achieving an outcome worthy of the sacrifices of the United States military in South and Central Asia.

Unlike Iraq, Syria or Libya, the involvement of the United States in Afghanistan has been with support from the majority of the Afghan people and has been against a regime linked to the terrorists who perpetrated 9-11 - the Taliban. As Barrack Obama rightly said, if the Iraq War was the "bad war," Afghanistan was the "good war."

For the Trump Administration to pull out of Afghanistan at this critical moment would send a message to America's adversities that it has no interest in prolonged and expensive conflicts, leading America's adversities to make calculated risks against the United States' interest, like the Russian annexation of Crimea. In short, US withdrawal from Afghanistan would make war with Iran or North Korea more likely rather than less likely.

The current South Asia strategy has shown positive results in 12 months. For the first time since 2001, two cease-fires were announced during Eid Al-Fitr between the Taliban and the Ghani government, an unprecedented moment in the last 40 years of conflict. This can be directly related to US pressure on Pakistan and increased ties with India, perhaps the most successful changes in the US strategy.

While maintaining pressure on Pakistan is achieving positive results in the short-term, in the long-term Pakistan is not a strategic partner that shares the same interests as those of the United States. Pakistan has no geopolitical interest in seeing a pro-US democracy in Afghanistan, nor in dismantling the Haqqani Network or the Taliban.

Pakistan also has covert support from China in continuing its destabilizing policy of funding terrorism in India-related spheres of influence, which includes Afghanistan. With the US increasingly looking to China as their largest adversity, Pakistan should be seen as an Islamist-Chinese vessel that shares no strategic interest with the United States - and that in spite of election of Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan.

Conversely, Russia has a geo-strategic interest in Afghanistan as paramount to that of the United States. Unlike China, Russia sees Afghanistan as a springboard for terrorism towards its vulnerable southern border. For this reason Russia is deepening relations with Pakistan and the Taliban, not out of interest but out of necessity, as few in Russia really believe the United States will remain in Afghanistan much longer.

Yet for all the Media talk of withdrawal, under President Trump the United States is more invested in Afghanistan than ever. Just recently in a Military Times article titled "US rejects invitation to join Russia talks on Afghanistan," the journalist notes additionally that Afghanistan will be integrated into the US' Indo-Pacific strategy. This can only mean one thing: further deterioration of relations between Pakistan and the United States in exchange for closer cooperation with India in Afghanistan and the wider region.

However, should US-Pakistani relations deteriorate further, the Pakistanis will block the US from entering Afghanistan using their sea-land routes, as Afghanistan remains land-locked. This will put the Trump Administration in a very difficult position: to withdraw from Afghanistan would be to cede the region to China; to wage war with Pakistan or Iran for a land route into Afghanistan would be deeply unpopular with the American public.

But a deal with Russia could provide the ultimate solution to this conundrum.

Many of President Trump's supporters see that a deal with Russia is not only preferable, but essential for curbing Chinese influence worldwide. Right now, Russian-Chinese ties are exceptionally strong, comparable to ties between the United States and Britain at the ending of the Second World War. To make inroads on this incredibly strong alliance must begin with converging interests.

This has played out to a certain extent in Syria, but the US' unwillingness to engage in any peace process except through Geneva has had a counter-productive impact on US-Russian relations. But shared goals of eliminating terrorism, restoring stability to Syria and securing Israel's interests are proof that, indeed, Russia and the United States agree on enough that a future deal in Afghanistan is possible.

For the US, components of such a deal would include ceding Pakistan to Russia, the relaxing of certain US sanctions and promising Russia and the nations to Afghanistan's north a more significant portion of Afghan economic projects - and that over Pakistan, China and Iran. In exchange, Russia would  provide for the US a land route into Afghanistan, more support for the Afghan government and more assistance to America's counter-terrorism strategy.

Such a deal may even be in the process right now, but through India rather than direct Russian-US contacts. India is a central partner in the US' Indo-Pacific strategy, has strong ties to both Russia and the United States, and has a vested interest in weaning the US off Pakistan in exchange for more friendly ties with the Kremlin.

For Afghanistan's sake, a US-Russian-Indian deal is best case scenario. Worst case scenario is a  repeat of the 1980's debacle, with a superpower defeated by Pakistan and terrorism ready to strike the world again.

If John Waver went full Bush in 2003

In two previous articles (see below) I detailed how John Waver would have handled an appropriate response to 9-11 in George Bush's place and secondly, had he been stuck in the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, how he would have reconstructed Iraq's political system.

http://jwaverterror.blogspot.com/2017/03/if-john-waver-had-been-george-w-bush.html
http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com/2017/04/if-john-waver-had-done-iraq-war.html

This article will go a step further and detail just exactly what sort of neo-con "bad war" John Waver would have done in 2003, had he enough malicious intent.

Firstly, in 2003 and beyond, John Waver would have never invaded Iraq. Though anti-Israel, Saddam's Iraq was a secular country which protected its Christian minorities, had its Kurdish territory taken away from it and was under crippling sanctions following the Gulf War. Further, any nuclear reactors that were found had been bombed by the Israelis, so the threat from Saddam's regime was not much greater to the Middle-East than the threat of Qaddafi's or Assad's.

A much more tempting target for John Waver, in a moment of malicious intent in 2002 - 2003, would have been a land war with Iran. This is not to be confused with regime change, in which the Khamanei regime in Tehran were overthrown and replaced with a US puppet - a greater scale Iraq. John Waver would have, under almost no circumstances, engaged in a regime change policy in Iran.

Consider the map below. The south of Iran dominates one half of the Persian Gulf, through which go the majority of the world's oil exports. A US occupation of southeast Iran from the Strait of Hormuz to the Iranian-Pakistani border in the south, to the Afghan border in the northeast would guarantee that Afghanistan, the US' newest ally, were no longer isolated in Central Asia but instead connected to the wider Middle-East.


(taken from Premium Times)

Such an occupation of southeast Iran would have been as bloody as the Iraq War - if not bloodier - but the strategic results of such a campaign would have been more equally in the favour of the US and Israel than the Iraq War. The Iraq War, along with the conflicts in Libya and Syria, did benefit Israel much more than it did the United States. The Afghan war, conversely, more largely benefit the United States than Israel. This solution sidelines that tension to a larger extent.

Connecting Afghanistan to a sea route that is not dictated by Pakistan, China, Russia or the Iranian regime would have meant greater support from US allies for Afghanistan. Though the "democratic project" from southeast Iran and Afghanistan would have infuriated Pakistan, the Gulf states would be forced to invest in it to keep Iranian influence contained. Should this "limited" Iran war and Afghan war fail, Iran would fill the vacuum and the Gulf states would be no better off.

Lastly, such an intervention would have benefit Israel and the US more equally. Suddenly for Israel, Afghanistan's stability (a security threat for the United States) would be tied to its own: as with the Gulf states, American withdrawal from Afghanistan and/or southeast Iran would impact its own ability to hold back the rogue regime of Iran. With a sea route for Afghanistan through southeast Iran, covert Israeli-Afghan relations could be more easily established in the image of Saudi Arabia's own covert relations with Israel - and this would be given more chance of diplomatic success with Afghanistan than with US-allied Iraq of today.

Afghanistan, therefore, would be integrated into the US' sphere of influence decisively, and that influence would be close to the borders of Russia and China, to keep the US' stance as a world power beyond question. Instead of aimlessly landing the majority of its 9-11 fury in Iraq and undermining the war in Afghanistan, as happened in 2003 - 2011, this "limited" Iran war would enormously assist with stabilization efforts not only in Afghanistan, but also in defeating many differing forms of terrorism across the region.

Such a war would keep the US committed beyond question to its new sphere of influence, and may even dissuade the US foreign policy establishment from further wars in countries like Iraq, Libya and Syria.

Neo-conservatism only works when building on one's own strategic interest. A "limited" Iran war would build on the Afghan war, and sufficiently distract the US from making erroneous blunders of a different kind in neighbouring countries.

Taliban peace and the future of the Afghan war

It is no secret that President Donald Trump is frustrated with the lack of progress in Afghanistan. However, the recent change to policy in the US engaging directly in dialogue with the Taliban is likely to have an adverse effect on winding down the Afghan war.

On the one hand, it legitimizes the one regime post-9-11 the United States has waged war on that does not deserve legitimacy. Neither Saddam's regime in Iraq, nor Qaddafi's regime in Libya nor Assad's regime in Syria harboured terrorists that planned and executed 9-11. For that matter, even ISIS didn't harbour Al-Qaeda and the two organizations remain mortal enemies. To give legitimacy to the Taliban undermines the war on terror completely and puts the United States on the same side as the terrorists which took down the world trade centre.

On the other hand, the Taliban's conditions in peace negotiations would leave the US the clear loser and the Taliban the clear winner. The Taliban want a withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and do not view the Afghan government with any type of legitimacy. They also see that the US is desperate for peace in Afghanistan.

But in that the Taliban misjudge this Administration. For them to believe that the Trump Administration will leave Afghanistan after the peace talks fail - and the peace talks will fail - is to clearly misjudge this American President. Though President Trump is not a fervent believer in the Afghan War, the advantages of escalating the Afghan war outweigh the advantages of a pullout.

First, the Afghan war gives a clear face to the proxy war between China and the United States. The Taliban are supported by Pakistan, and Pakistan is largely supported by China. Not only is the Afghan government US-backed, but it is also backed by India. Together, India and the US are China's main rival in Afghanistan and Asia as a whole.

Second, fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan allows President Trump to keep his commitment to protect the American people from terrorism. The Taliban are still linked to Al-Qaeda at the highest levels, and Al-Qaeda's focus on the "far enemy" over the "near enemy" mean that Al-Qaeda remains a more potent threat to the United States than ISIS. With the Trump Administration tacitly supporting a stronger Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Libya and Syria, it is important for the Administration to show their commitment to defeating terrorism elsewhere - namely in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Third, President Trump is eyeing a withdrawal from Syria before a withdrawal from Afghanistan. Clearly, Syria belongs to the long list of post 9-11 wars that increased the threat of terrorism in the region rather than decreased it. With Russia filling the void left by the US' lack of appetite for further regime change, the US is better positioned to withdraw from Syria than other countries like Afghanistan.

Fourth, Afghanistan provides a rare opportunity for the United States to work with Russia. With relations between Pakistan and America worsening by the day, it is only a matter of time before Pakistan bar entry for the US military into Afghanistan permanently. Should Pakistan do that, the United States will be faced with several options: first option would be a military pullout; second option would be to invade a neighbouring country like Iran or Pakistan to allow US troops into Afghanistan; third option would be to work with Russia.

Under this Administration, an invasion of Pakistan or Iran would be highly unlikely. While a subsequent military pullout from Afghanistan is possible, it is more likely that the Trump Administration will try and work with Russia on Afghanistan. The reason why this is possible is India. Even as the US grows closer to India, India still enjoys strong bilateral ties with Russia and can act as the mediator between the two nations.

It is quite likely that President Trump sees that within Afghanistan is the opportunity for Russia to get weaned off China. Should Russia be promised the lion's share of trade with Afghanistan that both India and the US enjoy, this would incentivise Russia to permit the US to move through Russia and the states of Central Asia into Afghanistan, even as Pakistani-Russian relations improve.

This would require some sanctions to be removed from Russia and President Trump would, of course, be faced by a hostile and anti-Russian US Congress. Similar to President Obama's negotiations with Iran, the US Congress is unlikely to be supportive of any attempts by President Trump to work with Russia, no matter the circumstances.

However, should Congress block an attempted thaw in US-Russian relations in the absence of the Pakistani route into Afghanistan, President Trump would withdraw militarily from Afghanistan. This would put Congress in a diabolical position and move the US public to increasingly favour rapprochement with Russia to defeat terrorism globally.

In any case, the future of the war in Afghanistan is likely to be decided in the next 4 years. Either the conflict will escalate with victory more clearly defined, or the hard efforts of the past three Administrations will be laid waste by Congress, and China will reap the benefits of a terrorist base in Afghanistan.

Withdrawal from Afghanistan wastes the only US war waged in the past 17 years that was the right one. It would leave the United States' status as a nation seeking justice and liberty as questionable. And rightly so.