Why ISIS will not return to Al-Qaeda

With the destruction of ISIS' territory, some pundits believe the group will return to Al-Qaeda. This is highly unlikely, because Abu Musab Az-Zarqawi's vision differed considerably from Bin Laden's.

ISIS was born out of the chaos of the Iraq War. Abu Musab Az-Zarqawi, the founder of ISIS under a different name, believed in the deliberate targeting of Shi'ite Muslims and other non-Sunnis to awaken the Sunni Muslim giant - a giant which stretches across every Muslim country in the globe except Iraq and Iran. Al-Qaeda, by contrast, has avoided inflaming sectarian hatred and instead wishes to bankrupt the 'far' enemies of Islam - such as the US and Russia - destroy Israel and slowly return the Muslim world to a state in which a Caliph might rule.

According to Michael Ware - a journalist who lived in Iraq after the war began - Zarqawi's group only pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda out of necessity and not because it aspired to its ideology. With ISIS having made its mark across Syria, Iraq and the globe; having declared the global Caliphate, it would completely undermine the ISIS vision of leading the global jihad to return to Al-Qaeda, and that even with the destruction of all ISIS territory.

More likely is that ISIS will return as an insurgency group in Iraq with the aim of destabilizing the Arabian Gulf, to provoke the last war between 'Rome' (that is, the United States) and the Islamic State. And in this regard, ISIS is likely to succeed where Al-Qaeda cannot, because Saudi Arabia and ISIS are more alike than either of them are to Al-Qaeda.

Needless to say, ISIS will not return to Al-Qaeda. But both will remain considerable threats to any country wishing to deal with the Middle-East.

What if ISIS takes over Saudi Arabia? Detailed analysis.

With the rise of Mohammed Bin Salman in Saudi Arabia, the likelihood of either civil war or an outright takeover of the conservative kingdom by ISIS has increased exponentially. This has only been brought further to likelihood by Iranian dominance in Iraq and Syria.

The important question is this: what if ISIS takes over Saudi Arabia? What would happen to the Middle-East and global politics?

1) US' hands would be tied. With pressure mounting on the current Trump Administration to deliver its promise of "America First," with military commitment to Iraq and Afghanistan remaining for the foreseeable future, with the threat of North Korea, there would little the US could do about an ISIS takeover of Saudi Arabia.

US strategy in such circumstance would be to use other Sunni proxies, such as the Jordanian and Egyptian armies, to wrest back control of Saudi Arabia from ISIS.

2) Iraq would be given Saudi's status of most important non-Israeli ally. With the destruction of the Saudi kingdom, the US would be forced to look elsewhere for its top non-Israeli ally in the Middle-East. Iraq would be the obvious choice for several reasons:

First, Iraq has oil, and oil comparable to Saudi oil. Second, it would be unlikely that the US would choose Iran as its top ally, due to its anti-Israeli rhetoric, and it would be less costly politically to use Iraq as the mediator between itself and Iran. Third, Iraq is the vulnerable corridor through which ISIS could expand its territory into the rest of the Middle-East, so it is in American interest to secure it. Fourth, Iraq and US already have better relations than the US has with several neighboring countries.

3) More Muslim countries would be less hesitant to ally or increase relations with Israel. Egyptian and Jordanian relations with Israel are already strong, but in such circumstances these relations would only become stronger.

From Iran and its allies, Iraq is the most likely country to increase relations with Israel substantially, and this due to the Iraqi-US alliance. This would parallel the current US-Israeli-Saudi relations of today, with Iraq instead of Saudi. Even the more anti-Israel states and groups from Iran's side, like Syria, Palestine and Hezbollah, would be forced to some level of rapprochement with Israel to counter the ISIS threat in the Gulf.

4) Other Gulf kingdoms would fall. With Saudi Arabia engulfed by ISIS, the other Gulf kingdoms would be vulnerable to ISIS takeover. Among these include Kuwait, Bahran, UAE and Qatar.

Kuwait and Bahrain are the most vulnerable because they themselves have larger Shi'ite populations. Should Shi'ite populations rise up, ISIS would correspondingly find more sympathy in each country. Qatar and UAE are vulnerable, but less so, as Qatar is protected by Turkey, and the UAE would be protected by Egypt, which helped fund Sisi's ascent to power.

Even so, Bahrain becoming the capital of the new ISIS Caliphate is a frightening possibility.

5) Oman and Yemen would likely survive. While the fate of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE is questionable, Oman and Yemen are more likely to survive an ISIS takeover of Saudi Arabia.

Why? A large reason is Russia. Russia has been eyeing a foothold in Yemen on the side of the Houthis for some time now. With ISIS warring against the Houthis in this scenario, Russia would be legitimized in establishing a no-fly-zone in Yemen and driving ISIS away. The Houthis would then easily take control of the remainder of Yemen as a buffer against ISIS-controlled territory to the north.

With regards to Oman, Oman has endured much peace in the region, and this can be traced back to the main expression of Islam in Oman: Ibadiya. Ibadiya is less focused on the physical jihad than its Sunni and Shi'ite counterparts, and instead cracks down hard on fitna, which is division or dissent. With a Houthi-controlled Yemen to its west and Iran just across the sea, Oman would survive and become an important partner for the west against ISIS.

6) Shi'ites would be killed or driven out. This is one of the more inhuman aspects of an ISIS takeover of Saudi Arabia: Shi'ites would be systematically targeted for extinction. Cities like Qatif and Damam would be levelled to the ground as ISIS would seek Shi'ite genocide. Many would flee to Kuwait and Bahrain, which would only bring ISIS to follow them.

For Gulf monarchies, this would be seen as a convenient way of removing Iran's foothold from the Arabian Gulf without directly engaging in brutal killings. However, the likelihood of their own demise would only increase with letting ISIS ethnically cleanse the Arabian Gulf of the Shi'ites.

Shi'ites surviving the genocide would likely relocate to Iran, Iraq or Syria. Thus the Sunni-Shi'ite balance of the region would be more evenly restored to how it was before the Iraq War.

7) Enormous instability would follow. The global instability that would follow is important to recognize. Not only would oil prices skyrocket; not only would Iran, Iraq, Russia and China get enormously wealthy, but many Muslims would fight jihad either for or against ISIS in the Arabian Peninsula. Millions would fight and millions would die there for or against ISIS.

More concerning for counter-terrorism is that, with ISIS' control of Mecca and Medina, their authority on Islam would solidify, and Muslims would pledge allegiance to ISIS all across the Muslim world, forcing their governments to fight and defeat them in many different countries.

8) The Saudi royal family might return. The Saudi royal family has survived attempted destruction before. When the Arabs revolted against the Ottoman Empire with help from Saud and Ibn Abdul Wahhab, the Saudis were crushed by the Ottomans, but they returned two centuries later in the kingdom we know today. With the Sauds being an enormously wealthy family, many would find shelter in the West, and could perhaps insight rebellion against ISIS once excitement for the reestablishment of the Caliphate has waned and the horrors of ISIS are revealed.



Much must be said about the foolishness of American foreign policy in the Middle-East. This possibility - that ISIS would take over Saudi Arabia - is unavoidable, because Mohammed Bin Salman serves as the best poster boy for ISIS recruitment in the Arabian Gulf.

Did Russia kill Baghdadi?

Russia claimed to kill Baghdadi in an airstrike several weeks ago. Should the information prove to be true, then this would be an enormous boost for the Russian air campaign in Syria. It would also strengthen the Syrian, Russian and Iranian hand in the Astana and Geneva talks for the conclusion of the Syrian civil war.

While the death of Baghdadi would certainly be a victory in the war on terror, it would not mean the end of ISIS, even should all territory in Iraq and Syria be regained. One only has to look back to how the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have risen to prominence after the death of Bin Laden to see that killing the leader of a terror organisation does not guarantee its destruction.

Further, examples should be noted from ISIS' own history. After the death of Abu Musab Az-Zarqawi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq from 1999 - 2006, the most bitter fighting was initiated by then AQI against the US-backed Iraqi forces. After the death of Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi in 2010, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, (ISI was AQI with an updated name) Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi took control. He revolutionized ISI by making the most of the Syrian Civil War to transform the group into ISIS. Today, the group goes by the name "Islamic State" and has stolen the limelight from Al-Qaeda.

While counter-terrorism experts say that one of Baghdadi's two deputies will take control of ISIS after the death of Baghdadi, there is a good reason to question this. Firstly, Baghdadi's two deputies are officers from the Saddam Hussein regime and have no religious authority in and of themselves. The next stage in ISIS' transformation is a critical lifeline: ISIS will transform from a Caliphate Army across Syria and Iraq to an Insurgency stretching from Iraq down into the Arabian Gulf. And the only way to ignite a civil war in a Gulf country like Saudi Arabia is to have someone with Islamic legitimacy to succeed Baghdadi as the next Caliph.

Many who celebrate the death of Baghdadi fail to see that ISIS' most deadly fight is yet to come. The Iraqi-Syrian war will be but a sideshow compared to ISIS' big battle for the Gulf. And a Caliph with Islamic legitimacy will very likely rise in Baghdadi's place.

Turkey deploys troops to Qatar to protect terror state

Erdogan's Turkey and Qatar share a very similar outlook and foreign policy.

In Libya, Egypt, Syria and Yemen, Turkey and Qatar have supported the Muslim Brotherhood. Both countries also supported ISIS long after Saudi Arabia and allies withdrew support for it.

And now, as Qatar becomes increasingly isolated by other members of the GCC, Turkey has deployed troops to the small resource-rich country in a show of support. Once again, Turkey has shown itself to be a loggerheads with Trump policy.

Trump gave the green light to funding Kurds in Syria against ISIS. This policy - also implemented under Obama - irritated Turkey so much that it mended ties with both Russia and Syria, to keep Bashar Al-Assad in power and curb Kurdish strength in Syria.

Now, after Trump's historic speech in Saudi Arabia, GCC nations are attempting to curb terrorism in their region by isolating Qatar, perhaps the largest funder of terrorism in the world. And Turkey has deployed troops to protect the terror state.

This is likely to force a realignment of powers in the region. Qatar and Turkey will end up more fully allied with the Iranian axis, and an opportunity now exists for Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC to push for closer relations with Iraq. If isolating Qatar was part of Trump's desired policy, improvement of GCC-Iraqi relations is also.

Things are now moving very dangerously for the Arabian Gulf. Should relations deteriorate in any form between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Turkey could use its base in Qatar from which to deploy terrorists into Saudi Arabia - after all, Qatar and Saudi Arabia do share a border. Turkey is overflowing with refugees - redeploying some of those refugees into Saudi Arabia via Qatar might be a way to decrease its problem.

Whether Iran would also get in on such a Qatar-Turkey plot is difficult to guess, as the likely outcome of a war in Saudi Arabia would be more stability for Syria and perhaps for Iraq as well, but Iran could lose their Shi'ite minorities in the Gulf.

What is certain now that Turkey has gotten involved is that regime change and military escalation against Qatar are now very unlikely. What is possible is that Qatar will be expelled from the GCC, sanctions will be put on Qatar and the US might have to relocate its military base from Qatar to the UAE.

On the other hand, Turkish-Saudi relations may deteriorate completely, and a civil war in Saudi Arabia may be plotted in retaliation to isolating Qatar.

Russia has fought the big battle in the war on terror

Russia's strategy is a winning strategy: scope, focus and a hard punch.

Like in world war 2, Russia's impact in the war on terror is marginally overlooked. Until Russia entered the Syrian civil war on the side of the Government, terrorism was largely winning worldwide. ISIS, while retreating in Iraq, was regrouping and attacking the government in Syria. Idlib in Syria had fallen to Al-Qaeda forces. Saudi was aiding Al-Qaeda in Yemen. Libya was an unsolvable debacle. Afghanistan was a stalemate.

But when Russia entered the Syrian Civil War in September 2015, it all changed. In Syria, there was nowhere to hide for any terrorism, whether ISIS - which was already suffering under American air strikes - or Al-Qaeda - which America was attacking far less.

The Syrian Civil War had reached its turning point. In a matter of 12 months, many rebel gains had been reversed. After 18 months, Aleppo city is back in the government's hands; ISIS is on the run from the Syrian Arab Army in Aleppo, Homs and Deir Ez-Zor provinces; the rebels are holed up in Idlib and rebels from other parts of Syria are periodically evacuated to Idlib and out of other cities.

This forced Obama to apply more military might. In the battle of Ramadi, more American air power resulted in victory, while in Libya, Obama moved to destroy ISIS in the city of Sirte. He also urged his Gulf allies to attack Al-Qaeda in Yemen while battling the Houthis, and halted withdrawal from Afghanistan.

I guess some call it, "Obama leading from behind." I call it Putin's genius.

Since Trump has gotten in power, Russia is doing more to end the war on terror than ever. Not only is Russia involved in Syria; Russia is moving behind the scenes in Libya to stabilize the Arabic state under Haftar Al-Khalifa with assistance from Egypt. Meanwhile, Putin is also eyeing Yemen as an extra country of influence should Syria and/or Libya stabilize, or should Russian operations in Syria be challenged.

Rather than tear down Russian gains in the war on terror - which was Hillary Clinton's foreign policy - Trump is likely to want to compete with Russia on who can deal the terrorists the most fatal blow. Trump is likely to strike these blows in Iraq and Afghanistan - in Iraq against ISIS and Iran, and in Afghanistan against the Taliban and by making Afghanistan into a "block" against Iran as Saddam's Iraq once was.

But Russia was the one who started these amazing victories. Even should Trump compete, Russia has fought the big battle in Syria on the war on terror.

Why ISIS is set to grow - not shrink - in the Middle-East

People who believe ISIS will be destroyed after the liberation of Syria and Iraq are not seeing the whole picture.

Many strategists of counter terrorism believe that, should ISIS be destroyed from Syria and Iraq, they won't be able to come back, and that Al-Qaeda is making more inroads by playing the "long game".

This ignores how much weaker Al-Qaeda has become since the death of Osama Bin Laden and the rise of ISIS. The only reasons why we're still talking about Al-Qaeda is because they represent a serious threat to Yemen and Afghanistan. In Syria, Al-Qaeda would join ISIS if the Assad Government were removed. They are only separate today because it is more acceptable for countries to fund Al-Qaeda than ISIS.

As it is, should the Assad Government stay in Syria, it is near impossible for Al-Qaeda to remain in Syria at the conclusion of the civil war. They will be completely obliterated - Jabhat Feteh Ash-Sham will be but a memory of the Syrian Civil War.

But ISIS... ISIS' origins are in Iraq, and as long as Iraq is as unstable as it has been since 2003, ISIS will also remain in Iraq. While Iraqi military gains have been impressive, ISIS has been gaining ground in suicide bombs and insurgent attacks, especially in Baghdad. While crushing terrorism in Syria is much easier - letting the dictator stay in power - this is unlikely to work as well in Iraq.

With Russia set to stabilize Syria and Libya, ISIS will be forced to dig deeper into the fabric of Iraq in order to survive. This represents one of the most serious challenges to the Trump Administration: how to stabilize Iraq and deprive ISIS of an underground safe haven.

Worryingly, while ISIS will be continuing to destabilize Iraq, their efforts will be turned towards Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. For further information on how ISIS threatens Saudi Arabia, read the following article by Alistair Crooke:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-aim-saudi-arabia_b_5748744.html

In fact, it is easy to see how this has been the aim of ISIS all along: declare a Caliphate across Syria and Iraq, force all enemies to utterly destroy the Caliphate, then to "rebirth" the Caliphate in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

So far, no one in counter terrorism is addressing this. They are looking at the paper tiger of Al-Qaeda in Syria, when they should be looking at the threat ISIS is to the Arabian Gulf!

Not only is war and instability coming to Saudi Arabia, but also to most of the other Gulf states: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and U.A.E (Dubai), which may lead to the fall of these smaller kingdoms to ISIS. Such instability will cause an oil shortage - greatly increasing oil prices and forcing the whole world to gaze in horror at Saudi Arabia as they have been in Syria.

Destroying ISIS from the Arabian Gulf will be a near impossible task. Once ISIS detonates there, it will be easier for America to stabilize Iraq than drive ISIS out of Saudi Arabia.

Predictions for Trump and the war on terror

These are my predictions for the war on terror in the next 4 - 8 years under Trump:

1) The jihadists' spaces will shrink. In Syria and Libya, Russia is pushing radical Islamic jihadists out of power and is replacing them with strong governments in Bashar Al-Assad and Haftar Al-Khalifa respectively. Trump is unlikely to wage war over these Russian policies. Trump is also likely to double down on Afghanistan and Iraq after ISIS is defeated, to utterly destroy the Taliban in Afghanistan and to make sure ISIS does not return to Iraq.

2) The jihadist space in Yemen will grow. By supporting the Saudi-led war on Yemen, America is likely to be hurled into a quagmire almost as deadly as Syria. By striking Al-Qaeda and supporting the Saudi air war on Yemen, Trump is attacking two enemies - who are fighting each other - at the same time. Ultimately, one has to prevail over the other.

In the case of Yemen, Al-Qaeda is perceived by Saudi less of a threat than the Houthis, so Trump will probably be forced to either withdraw support for the Saudi war on Yemen, or allow Al-Qaeda to grow in Yemen at the expense of the Houthis. Either way, the jihadist space in Yemen is set to grow under Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

3) ISIS and Al-Qaeda will come to Saudi Arabia. Should Trump let Russia stabilize Libya and Syria while Trump himself focuses on stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia will become incredibly vulnerable to civil war. This is largely due to Mohammed Bin Salman trying to modernize the kingdom in a completely impractical way, while also tying up too many Saudi resources in Yemen.

This will likely lead to Saudi Arabia imploding, with ISIS being a problem in the north, east and centre of the country while Al-Qaeda ending up a problem in the south of the country. What America does in that situation is anyone's guess.

4) American relations with Middle-East nations will change drastically. It seems to me that Turkish-American relations are at the worst point in their history, due to having different priorities in the Syrian Civil War: for the Turks, the priority is the Kurds; for America, the priority is ISIS.

With Turkish-American relations set to further deteriorate, in Turkey's place America will likely raise up its US-dependent, allies - and those with enormous resources - to a different level of relations. Iraq and Afghanistan come to mind in particular. Both have potential to function similarly to how Turkey had functioned for America in the past and, should they become stable, will become strong enough to keep American allies powerful in the region due to enormous swathes of natural resources.

In addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, relations with Jordan and Egypt are likely to deepen, as well as, predictably, Israel. These strengthening and weakening of relations will all affect the war on terror, as countries which have supported terrorism, like Turkey and Pakistan, are more likely to end up US' enemies rather than allies.


These are the predictions during the - likely - 2 presidential terms of the Trump Administration. We'll find out just how close or off the mark I was in due time.