What Trump's reelection would mean for the Middle-East

Should Donald Trump be reelected as President of the United States, the Chinese Communist Party would try and prevent the US' pivot to the Pacific by putting pressure on core interests in the Middle-East.

Cold War 2 will only begin if Donald Trump is reelected President.

Donald Trump's 2016 election, contrary to the mainstream narrative, greatly assisted and eased tensions in the Middle-East. Donald Trump struck a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, which saw the Syrian Arab Army destroy ISIS to the west of the Euphrates, while to the Euphrates' east in Syria and in Iraq, American, Kurdish and Iraqi forces eradicated ISIS almost completely. Following the destruction of ISIS, the Trump Administration further sought to end the Afghan war by negotiation with the Taliban and, in Europe, did little to antagonize Russia, except in leveraging sanctions.

Additionally: Donald Trump has been laser-focused on the Chinese Communist Party and on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Both nations threaten the US' core strategic interests, and with the arrival of Covid-19, relations between the US and China have been almost irreversibly damaged. With Iran, harsh US sanctions have seen the Islamic Republic challenged as never before, with protests in Lebanon and Iraq threatening to tear down the governments Iran supports.

A Joe Biden Presidency, on the other hand, would be marked by a return to the dangerous neo-liberalism of previous Presidents Barrack Obama and George W. Bush, one that saw military interventions expand into Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen and also saw antagonism with Russia reach its highest levels since the Cold War.  The antagonism with Russia culminated in the threat of a second Cuban Missile Crisis, with neo-liberal Hillary Clinton campaigning for a "no fly zone" in Syria. Had Hillary Clinton won the Presidency in 2016 and followed through on a "no fly zone," it would have resulted in the shooting down of Russian planes in Syria.

Meanwhile, under Washington neo-liberalism of the past 27 years, core US national security threats China and Iran were able to get away with murder and sanctions relief while the US was bogged down elsewhere. Joe Biden's likely loss in 2020 will come as a shock to both China and Iran, and force the nations to come to each other's aid. Earlier this year a draft of a strategic partnership was released to the international press, one likely to be implemented in the event of a Trump reelection. For a second term of the Trump Administration, a strategic partnership between Iran and China would be one of its toughest challenges.

China is so irritated by the US' pivot to the Pacific that, through its strategic partnership with Iran, it would intend to draw US attention back into the Middle-East. In Lebanon, the current regime is likely to fall and be, temporarily, replaced by a true democracy. However, shortly after this democratic regime comes to power, Hezbollah will take military control of the country. Russia would likely acquiesce to such a coup, because in exchange it could see Iran and Hezbollah leave Syria. Backed by Iran, Hezbollah's coup on Lebanon is still very risky; but with Chinese support behind Iran, democratic Lebanon would be sure to fall.

On the other hand, Iraq is safe from an Iran-China conspiracy, largely thanks to President Trump's resolute support for the country. By destroying ISIS and then going after Iran with sanctions, President Trump has shown the region that Iraq is central to American foreign policy and, in spite of the withdrawal of some US troops, the US is unlikely to leave Iraq permanently any time soon. Further: the assassination of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020 severely weakened Iran's hand in Iraq, and in the long-term a US-friendly regime is likely to be left behind in Iraq as part of President Trump's legacy.

Afghanistan, however, is very much at risk from the Iran-China strategic partnership, as Afghanistan's major borders are with Iran and China-allied Pakistan. In exchange for economic partnership, China is likely to put pressure on Iran to ditch its balanced approach in Afghanistan and unilaterally put its weight behind the Taliban. Should the Taliban join the Iran-China axis, Afghanistan would return to its worst fighting in decades, and the Taliban would march on Kabul.

For the US and Afghanistan, Iran's appointment of Esmail Qaani as new Quds Force commander ought to serve as another clear warning. Esmail Qaani has a long history of funnelling Iranian weapons for both the Afghan Taliban and government - with Iran vowing vengeance against the US for assassinating Qassem Soleimani, Qaani's predecessor, supporting the Taliban to bring down the US allied government in Kabul would be one of the easiest ways to send that message.

Should China, Iran and the Taliban destabilize Afghanistan, it is quite likely that the United States would return, and like Iraq, the US would return to stay for the long-term. However, further US interventions in the Middle-East after Iraq and Afghanistan are highly unlikely. The Trump Administration would need to retain flexibility in case China moves to invade Taiwan. Not only does this protect Iran from US invasion; it also presents China and Iran with opportunities for strategic dominance in the Arabian Gulf.

As the Trump Administration continues to withdraw from the region, rapprochement with Israel is the future security guarantee for Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. However, such rapprochement is fraught with risk, especially for Saudi Arabia, the largest Middle-Eastern nation considering Israeli ties. Such rapprochement between Iran and Israel led to the downfall of the Shah and landed Ayatollah Khomeini in charge of the nation; if China works with Iran to destabilize the Arabian Gulf, similar scenarios may play out there.

As the US withdraws, Turkey, Iran and China will be looking to increase their dominance - if Saudi Arabia erupts in civil war, the US will be too preoccupied in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Pacific to offer much assistance. Pakistan, though a longtime military ally of Saudi Arabia, is increasingly indebted to China, and might be forced to choose between the kingdom and China. For Pakistan itself, if Mohammed Bin Salman is king and makes rapprochement with Israel, that might also contribute to Pakistani neutrality in the event of a Saudi civil war.

Since the 2003 Iraq War, the Middle-East has been an unsafe and unstable place. Should Donald Trump be reelected, the Second Cold War would be lit, and Middle-East instability would be likely to get a lot worse. Worst of all: for the Middle-East, outside of Israel, Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a good chance that the Chinese will win over the Americans.

How the United States could have won the war on terror in 2003

While invading Iraq in 2003 greatly increased the threat of terrorism in the region, the only feasible option for decreasing terrorism in the region in the long-term was to weaken Iran.

While it is an exaggeration to say that Iran is the world’s number 1 sponsor of terrorism, it can certainly be said that Iran is the number 1 galvanizer of terrorism.

Without the Islamic Republic of Iran, 9-11 would have never happened. The Iranian revolution finished in February 1979 and threatened to spread the revolution elsewhere. The the first culprit of the Islamic revolution was Saudi Arabia.

9 months after the Iranian Revolution, in November 1979, extremists from within the kingdom seized the Grand Holy Mosque of Mecca and threatened to destroy it if their demands for a more Islamic country were not met. Though the extremists were executed, afterwards the kingdom underwent a conservative counterrevolution, which enabled the funding of Islamic jihad in the 1980’s and sowed the seeds for Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda.

Though the extremists in Saudi Arabia were not politically affiliated with Iran, undoubtedly they were inspired by the Islamic revolution of Iran: either through admiration of Islamists taking control of Iran, or terrified of Iran’s Shi’a extremism and wanting a Sunni response provoked from within their own country.

What President Bush did in 2003, however, exacerbated and accelerated the increase of terrorism in the Middle-East. Instead of curbing Islamic extremism, the Iraq War empowered terrorism on both sides of the Sunni-Shi’ite spectrum, giving Iraq both Shi’a extremists and ISIS. If George Bush promised to go after terrorism, his actions in 2003 profoundly enhanced terrorism’s appeal across the Islamic world for both the Sunnis and Shi’ites.

Though going after Iraq was the worst of many bad options, going after US allies who have ties to Al-Qaeda funding would have not been much better. A conflict in the Arabian Gulf would have seriously risked instability in an area where the majority of the world’s oil comes from. For those who believe the west needs to get off oil, such an intervention might be considered necessary, but pragmatically it would have left the global economy far more vulnerable during the Great Financial Crisis than it was.

Weakening Iran in 2003, therefore, would have been the better option for ending radical Islamic terrorism’s appeal in the Middle-East. Iran has been the provocateur of extremism in US allies; it funds extremism itself and it is seeking nuclear weapons with the capacity to destroy Israel and the United States. It should not be forgotten that the national anthem of Iran is “death to America, death to Israel.” This is not hyperbole. This is the anthem of who is in charge of the most powerful country in the Middle-East.

However, weakening Iran would not mean regime change. Changing the regime in Iraq empowered extremists on both sides, and a regime change in Iran would have had a similar effect. Not only so: a US occupation of Iran’s population centres would have led to enormous amount of casualties for the US, as Iran is more politically unified than Iraq.

Instead of taking control of all of Iran, it would have been more feasible for the US to annex four provinces in Iran’s southeast, taking from Iran the Strait of Hormuz and all land crossings into Afghanistan and Pakistan. These areas are sparsely populated, which would have meant that, after a conventional war, occupation of them would have been easier even than occupying Iraq.

Better still: these provinces could be annexed from Iran and given to Afghanistan, which would mean Afghanistan would have a secure sea route that is not dominated by Russia, China or Pakistan. Such an option would have enabled Afghanistan to exploit its enormous mineral reserves much more quickly and would have connected Afghanistan to US allies in the Middle-East. This, in turn, would have allowed the Afghan war to end in a shorter amount of time.

Seeing a weaker Iran, US allies who previously funded Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan would have incentive to rebuild Afghanistan as a bulwark against Iran. A weaker Iran would have given US allies less reason to fund extremism and more assurance that their security would be looked after.

The impending Russia-US deal on Afghanistan

To win more speedily in Afghanistan, the United States must repair relations with Russia, withdraw from Pakistan and take the northern route into the country.

If there was ever a chance for President Trump to restore relations with Russia, weaken China and defeat radical Islamism, Afghanistan is that opportunity.

It has been a year since the Trump Administration unveiled the South Asia strategy, which was aimed at ending the Afghan war by having a conditions-based approach rather than a time-based approach, applying more international pressure on Pakistan, increasing trilateral ties between the US, India and Afghanistan, and, most importantly, achieving an outcome worthy of the sacrifices of the United States military in South and Central Asia.

Unlike Iraq, Syria or Libya, the involvement of the United States in Afghanistan has been with support from the majority of the Afghan people and has been against a regime linked to the terrorists who perpetrated 9-11 - the Taliban. As Barrack Obama rightly said, if the Iraq War was the "bad war," Afghanistan was the "good war."

For the Trump Administration to pull out of Afghanistan at this critical moment would send a message to America's adversities that it has no interest in prolonged and expensive conflicts, leading America's adversities to make calculated risks against the United States' interest, like the Russian annexation of Crimea. In short, US withdrawal from Afghanistan would make war with Iran or North Korea more likely rather than less likely.

The current South Asia strategy has shown positive results in 12 months. For the first time since 2001, two cease-fires were announced during Eid Al-Fitr between the Taliban and the Ghani government, an unprecedented moment in the last 40 years of conflict. This can be directly related to US pressure on Pakistan and increased ties with India, perhaps the most successful changes in the US strategy.

While maintaining pressure on Pakistan is achieving positive results in the short-term, in the long-term Pakistan is not a strategic partner that shares the same interests as those of the United States. Pakistan has no geopolitical interest in seeing a pro-US democracy in Afghanistan, nor in dismantling the Haqqani Network or the Taliban.

Pakistan also has covert support from China in continuing its destabilizing policy of funding terrorism in India-related spheres of influence, which includes Afghanistan. With the US increasingly looking to China as their largest adversity, Pakistan should be seen as an Islamist-Chinese vessel that shares no strategic interest with the United States - and that in spite of election of Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan.

Conversely, Russia has a geo-strategic interest in Afghanistan as paramount to that of the United States. Unlike China, Russia sees Afghanistan as a springboard for terrorism towards its vulnerable southern border. For this reason Russia is deepening relations with Pakistan and the Taliban, not out of interest but out of necessity, as few in Russia really believe the United States will remain in Afghanistan much longer.

Yet for all the Media talk of withdrawal, under President Trump the United States is more invested in Afghanistan than ever. Just recently in a Military Times article titled "US rejects invitation to join Russia talks on Afghanistan," the journalist notes additionally that Afghanistan will be integrated into the US' Indo-Pacific strategy. This can only mean one thing: further deterioration of relations between Pakistan and the United States in exchange for closer cooperation with India in Afghanistan and the wider region.

However, should US-Pakistani relations deteriorate further, the Pakistanis will block the US from entering Afghanistan using their sea-land routes, as Afghanistan remains land-locked. This will put the Trump Administration in a very difficult position: to withdraw from Afghanistan would be to cede the region to China; to wage war with Pakistan or Iran for a land route into Afghanistan would be deeply unpopular with the American public.

But a deal with Russia could provide the ultimate solution to this conundrum.

Many of President Trump's supporters see that a deal with Russia is not only preferable, but essential for curbing Chinese influence worldwide. Right now, Russian-Chinese ties are exceptionally strong, comparable to ties between the United States and Britain at the ending of the Second World War. To make inroads on this incredibly strong alliance must begin with converging interests.

This has played out to a certain extent in Syria, but the US' unwillingness to engage in any peace process except through Geneva has had a counter-productive impact on US-Russian relations. But shared goals of eliminating terrorism, restoring stability to Syria and securing Israel's interests are proof that, indeed, Russia and the United States agree on enough that a future deal in Afghanistan is possible.

For the US, components of such a deal would include ceding Pakistan to Russia, the relaxing of certain US sanctions and promising Russia and the nations to Afghanistan's north a more significant portion of Afghan economic projects - and that over Pakistan, China and Iran. In exchange, Russia would  provide for the US a land route into Afghanistan, more support for the Afghan government and more assistance to America's counter-terrorism strategy.

Such a deal may even be in the process right now, but through India rather than direct Russian-US contacts. India is a central partner in the US' Indo-Pacific strategy, has strong ties to both Russia and the United States, and has a vested interest in weaning the US off Pakistan in exchange for more friendly ties with the Kremlin.

For Afghanistan's sake, a US-Russian-Indian deal is best case scenario. Worst case scenario is a  repeat of the 1980's debacle, with a superpower defeated by Pakistan and terrorism ready to strike the world again.

If John Waver went full Bush in 2003

In two previous articles (see below) I detailed how John Waver would have handled an appropriate response to 9-11 in George Bush's place and secondly, had he been stuck in the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, how he would have reconstructed Iraq's political system.

http://jwaverterror.blogspot.com/2017/03/if-john-waver-had-been-george-w-bush.html
http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com/2017/04/if-john-waver-had-done-iraq-war.html

This article will go a step further and detail just exactly what sort of neo-con "bad war" John Waver would have done in 2003, had he enough malicious intent.

Firstly, in 2003 and beyond, John Waver would have never invaded Iraq. Though anti-Israel, Saddam's Iraq was a secular country which protected its Christian minorities, had its Kurdish territory taken away from it and was under crippling sanctions following the Gulf War. Further, any nuclear reactors that were found had been bombed by the Israelis, so the threat from Saddam's regime was not much greater to the Middle-East than the threat of Qaddafi's or Assad's.

A much more tempting target for John Waver, in a moment of malicious intent in 2002 - 2003, would have been a land war with Iran. This is not to be confused with regime change, in which the Khamanei regime in Tehran were overthrown and replaced with a US puppet - a greater scale Iraq. John Waver would have, under almost no circumstances, engaged in a regime change policy in Iran.

Consider the map below. The south of Iran dominates one half of the Persian Gulf, through which go the majority of the world's oil exports. A US occupation of southeast Iran from the Strait of Hormuz to the Iranian-Pakistani border in the south, to the Afghan border in the northeast would guarantee that Afghanistan, the US' newest ally, were no longer isolated in Central Asia but instead connected to the wider Middle-East.


(taken from Premium Times)

Such an occupation of southeast Iran would have been as bloody as the Iraq War - if not bloodier - but the strategic results of such a campaign would have been more equally in the favour of the US and Israel than the Iraq War. The Iraq War, along with the conflicts in Libya and Syria, did benefit Israel much more than it did the United States. The Afghan war, conversely, more largely benefit the United States than Israel. This solution sidelines that tension to a larger extent.

Connecting Afghanistan to a sea route that is not dictated by Pakistan, China, Russia or the Iranian regime would have meant greater support from US allies for Afghanistan. Though the "democratic project" from southeast Iran and Afghanistan would have infuriated Pakistan, the Gulf states would be forced to invest in it to keep Iranian influence contained. Should this "limited" Iran war and Afghan war fail, Iran would fill the vacuum and the Gulf states would be no better off.

Lastly, such an intervention would have benefit Israel and the US more equally. Suddenly for Israel, Afghanistan's stability (a security threat for the United States) would be tied to its own: as with the Gulf states, American withdrawal from Afghanistan and/or southeast Iran would impact its own ability to hold back the rogue regime of Iran. With a sea route for Afghanistan through southeast Iran, covert Israeli-Afghan relations could be more easily established in the image of Saudi Arabia's own covert relations with Israel - and this would be given more chance of diplomatic success with Afghanistan than with US-allied Iraq of today.

Afghanistan, therefore, would be integrated into the US' sphere of influence decisively, and that influence would be close to the borders of Russia and China, to keep the US' stance as a world power beyond question. Instead of aimlessly landing the majority of its 9-11 fury in Iraq and undermining the war in Afghanistan, as happened in 2003 - 2011, this "limited" Iran war would enormously assist with stabilization efforts not only in Afghanistan, but also in defeating many differing forms of terrorism across the region.

Such a war would keep the US committed beyond question to its new sphere of influence, and may even dissuade the US foreign policy establishment from further wars in countries like Iraq, Libya and Syria.

Neo-conservatism only works when building on one's own strategic interest. A "limited" Iran war would build on the Afghan war, and sufficiently distract the US from making erroneous blunders of a different kind in neighbouring countries.

Taliban peace and the future of the Afghan war

It is no secret that President Donald Trump is frustrated with the lack of progress in Afghanistan. However, the recent change to policy in the US engaging directly in dialogue with the Taliban is likely to have an adverse effect on winding down the Afghan war.

On the one hand, it legitimizes the one regime post-9-11 the United States has waged war on that does not deserve legitimacy. Neither Saddam's regime in Iraq, nor Qaddafi's regime in Libya nor Assad's regime in Syria harboured terrorists that planned and executed 9-11. For that matter, even ISIS didn't harbour Al-Qaeda and the two organizations remain mortal enemies. To give legitimacy to the Taliban undermines the war on terror completely and puts the United States on the same side as the terrorists which took down the world trade centre.

On the other hand, the Taliban's conditions in peace negotiations would leave the US the clear loser and the Taliban the clear winner. The Taliban want a withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and do not view the Afghan government with any type of legitimacy. They also see that the US is desperate for peace in Afghanistan.

But in that the Taliban misjudge this Administration. For them to believe that the Trump Administration will leave Afghanistan after the peace talks fail - and the peace talks will fail - is to clearly misjudge this American President. Though President Trump is not a fervent believer in the Afghan War, the advantages of escalating the Afghan war outweigh the advantages of a pullout.

First, the Afghan war gives a clear face to the proxy war between China and the United States. The Taliban are supported by Pakistan, and Pakistan is largely supported by China. Not only is the Afghan government US-backed, but it is also backed by India. Together, India and the US are China's main rival in Afghanistan and Asia as a whole.

Second, fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan allows President Trump to keep his commitment to protect the American people from terrorism. The Taliban are still linked to Al-Qaeda at the highest levels, and Al-Qaeda's focus on the "far enemy" over the "near enemy" mean that Al-Qaeda remains a more potent threat to the United States than ISIS. With the Trump Administration tacitly supporting a stronger Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Libya and Syria, it is important for the Administration to show their commitment to defeating terrorism elsewhere - namely in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Third, President Trump is eyeing a withdrawal from Syria before a withdrawal from Afghanistan. Clearly, Syria belongs to the long list of post 9-11 wars that increased the threat of terrorism in the region rather than decreased it. With Russia filling the void left by the US' lack of appetite for further regime change, the US is better positioned to withdraw from Syria than other countries like Afghanistan.

Fourth, Afghanistan provides a rare opportunity for the United States to work with Russia. With relations between Pakistan and America worsening by the day, it is only a matter of time before Pakistan bar entry for the US military into Afghanistan permanently. Should Pakistan do that, the United States will be faced with several options: first option would be a military pullout; second option would be to invade a neighbouring country like Iran or Pakistan to allow US troops into Afghanistan; third option would be to work with Russia.

Under this Administration, an invasion of Pakistan or Iran would be highly unlikely. While a subsequent military pullout from Afghanistan is possible, it is more likely that the Trump Administration will try and work with Russia on Afghanistan. The reason why this is possible is India. Even as the US grows closer to India, India still enjoys strong bilateral ties with Russia and can act as the mediator between the two nations.

It is quite likely that President Trump sees that within Afghanistan is the opportunity for Russia to get weaned off China. Should Russia be promised the lion's share of trade with Afghanistan that both India and the US enjoy, this would incentivise Russia to permit the US to move through Russia and the states of Central Asia into Afghanistan, even as Pakistani-Russian relations improve.

This would require some sanctions to be removed from Russia and President Trump would, of course, be faced by a hostile and anti-Russian US Congress. Similar to President Obama's negotiations with Iran, the US Congress is unlikely to be supportive of any attempts by President Trump to work with Russia, no matter the circumstances.

However, should Congress block an attempted thaw in US-Russian relations in the absence of the Pakistani route into Afghanistan, President Trump would withdraw militarily from Afghanistan. This would put Congress in a diabolical position and move the US public to increasingly favour rapprochement with Russia to defeat terrorism globally.

In any case, the future of the war in Afghanistan is likely to be decided in the next 4 years. Either the conflict will escalate with victory more clearly defined, or the hard efforts of the past three Administrations will be laid waste by Congress, and China will reap the benefits of a terrorist base in Afghanistan.

Withdrawal from Afghanistan wastes the only US war waged in the past 17 years that was the right one. It would leave the United States' status as a nation seeking justice and liberty as questionable. And rightly so.

Conservative Pundits underestimate dangers in Afghanistan

There are those on the political right, such as news network Breitbart, that believe the solution to the Afghan conflict is a US withdrawal.

They are correct to conclude that the United States has far too large a footprint across the globe, but the continual focus by select conservative media on a pullout from Afghanistan over areas like Syria or Iraq is incredibly worrying. The United States meddled in both Syria and Iraq though neither regime threatened US interests. Both were terrible interventions that have darkened the pages of American history - and, worse still, distracted the United States from securing victory in Afghanistan.

The pundits are pointing to withdrawal from the wrong conflict. Instead of pushing for withdrawal from Afghanistan, they would be better served to push for withdrawal from Syria - as President Trump is doing.

Unlike in Syria, the dangers in Afghanistan are enormous for the United States. The Taliban still maintains its integral ties to Al-Qaeda, and has given no credible reassurance to the United States that Al-Qaeda will not return to the region after a US withdrawal. A US withdrawal from Afghanistan would only serve to embolden the Taliban. That commentators suggest the Taliban has no interest in making Afghanistan an Al-Qaeda stronghold again is not only naive and dangerous - it is terrible journalism.

It is important to note that Ayman Az-Zawahiri, the leader of Al-Qaeda, still pledged allegiance to the head of the Afghan Taliban in 2016, 15 years after the beginning of the Afghan War. This gives a clear example of the integral relationship between the top of Al-Qaeda leadership and the Taliban, which has not abated in any way, shape or form - except by US pressure in Afghanistan.

Perhaps ISIS is the greater threat to the interests of the United States - but even so, ISIS did not shelter the terrorist organization that killed thousands of American civilians. The Taliban did so, and still refuses to cut ties to the instigators of 9-11 even after 17 years of war.

It would be fair for conservative media to point out that, so far, strategy has not been working in Afghanistan. But perhaps this comes from incorrect beliefs within the American government:

1) a military solution is impossible in Afghanistan
2) the Taliban should be pressured to the negotiating table to end the war

To answer the first point: for the United States to doubt a military solution in Afghanistan shows weakness in the face of their enemies. Perhaps alone, a military solution is impossible - but through careful economic policy, from crippling the Taliban's opium supplies to Afghan exploitation of their minerals, the Taliban can be starved and crippled.

To answer the second point: bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table would be a fruitless endeavour. Bringing the tribes which back the Taliban to the negotiating table would be more beneficial. The Taliban organization itself, so long as it remains in Afghanistan, can not be trusted to negotiate in good faith. Such a policy would be like suggesting negotiating with Boko Haram or ISIS.

What is at stake in Afghanistan is not only American safety from Al-Qaeda, but its own reputation as the dominant superpower. While the US has been unable to end either the Iraq or Afghan wars, Vladimir Putin of Russia is on the cusp of a seismic victory in Syria, one which will leave the United States on the back foot internationally until it can replicate similar victories.

Issues of corruption, terrorism and democracy in the Islamic world continue to hold enormous challenges for the United States. Instead of talking about withdrawal from Afghanistan, conservative pundits would be better advised to find innovative ways to win the conflict that matters: the Afghan war where the perpetrators of 9-11 still threaten America.

After all, as President Donald Trump has said, "No dream is too big. No challenge is too great. Nothing we want for our future is beyond our reach." It is time conservatives followed his lead and sought an enduring outcome for the United States in Afghanistan.

ًWhy Libya is a disaster waiting to happen

Libya in the next 5 years may be the same as the Iraq of 2014.

During 2011 - 2013, Iraq was often out of the headlines, but it was plagued by rampant instability, chaos and political stalemate. Ultimately it was these reasons that led to Iraq's downfall in 2014 with the invasion of ISIS and the resignation of Nouri Al-Maliki from his position as Prime Minister.

Like the Iraq of 2011 - 2013, Libya has received much less media coverage today than Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan, but the Arab country has been in a state of chaos since 2011 and has been in civil war since 2014.

With the conflicts in Syria and Iraq receding in violence and with the Taliban under enormous pressure in Afghanistan, the future of jihad is likely to be found in Libya.

According to Aaron Zeilin, a foreign expert on Jihad,

“Libya now stands as the fourth-largest foreign fighter mobilization in global jihadist history, behind only the current war in Syria, the Afghan jihad of the 1980s, and the 2003 Iraq war."

(Excerpt taken from: http://www.arabnews.com/node/1238741

This is a frightening statistic, especially since both the US and Russia are tied up in other conflicts. While Libya is currently the fourth-largest foreign fighter mobilization in global jihadist history, jihadist mobilization would increase in Libya if it is defeated elsewhere.

Though Russia has explored political solutions for Libya, it has shown restraint due no doubt to prioritizing the complicated crisis in Syria. The historic "Iraq war in reverse" may have seen terrorism irrevocably reversed, but it has also tied up Russian war resources in Syria at the expense of Libya.

For President Donald Trump, though his strategy in Syria is fundamentally flawed (see http://jwaversyria.blogspot.com.au/2018/01/turkish-invasion-into-kurdish-afrin.html) Trump's strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan are sound. (see link here http://jwaveruspolitics.blogspot.com.au/2017/12/trumps-afghanistan-strategy-is-asia.html)

Should the counter-terrorism projects of Russia and the US prove successful in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, undoubtedly terrorists will look elsewhere to extract vengeance against these superpowers - Libya is the obvious choice.

Given Libya's size, (1.76 million square km, compared to Syria's 185 hundred thousand square km) strategic location, (central Mediterranean, bordering Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, Chad and Niger) low population size, (5.6 million Libyans in 2012 compared to Syria's 18.28 million) and rampant instability, (like Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria) Libya is an ideal place from which terrorists could exact revenge should they be rolled back elsewhere.

Countries which have previously supported Salafi terrorism - such as Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan - stand to benefit from a worsening crisis in Libya. Should Libya unfold in the next years as Iraq did in 2014, jihad will be focused on Libya and not the countries which funded terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

Of course, none of this could have happened without the Obama Administration's overthrow of Moammar Al-Qaddafi in 2011. If Afghanistan in the 1980's, Iraq in 2003 and Syria's civil war weren't proof enough, Libya should hammer home the reality of regime change in the Middle-East and the Arab world:

It breeds more terrorism.